Mel Bost – PMO Expert

Readers of this blog will know that I talk about behaviors of PMO project managers, team members, stakeholders, and others in the project community.  These are real behaviors that I have seen in my experiences working in and setting up several PMOs.

Much has been written in recent years about strategic partnerships in project management.  The idea is for parties to collaborate to ensure success of an organization such as a PMO long-term as projects are executed in support of strategic directions.

Consider the following scenario.  A PMO initiates a systems project in support of a major business/functional group in the organization known as the Commercial Group.  The Commercial Group is engaged in activities ancillary to the firm’s core businesses, and in order to achieve its returns, it operates in markets focusing on short-term, day-to-day operations.  The PMO systems project is designed to use a vendor-developed application, and its supporting systems, to provide the Commercial Group’s day-to-day operational and transactional focus.   The Commercial Group identifies a number of potential vendors and evaluates which vendor could supply the systems requirements on an on ongoing basis.  It then selects a vendor and development work proceeds until the system is in production.

Over the next several years the Commercial Group’s activities and returns flourish, and the vendor makes a  number of requested improvements.  Every time a new and updated system and application requirement was identified by the Commercial Group in response to the market, the vendor delivered.  

Switch gears for a moment….

A number of years ago while working for Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) in California, I had the opportunity to serve on the Board of Advisors for the University of California–Irvine Science Education Advisory Board.   The Board advised the professors and administrators in the School of Physical Sciences on their K-12 development programs for students and teachers.  Funding for the work was provided through contributions from local corporations to the Board.  Each year the professors and administrators solicited the corporations for funding based on the premise that the K-12 programs would remain the same quality and scope as in previous years.  After a few years, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the budget would be the same or perhaps increased slightly from the previous year because additional corporate contributors were identified.  An annual report of the Board to the contributing corporations provided details of the K-12 programs and the breadth of participation among K-12 teachers and students.

After serving on the Board for several years, I was summoned one day by two professors who were instrumental as leaders of the program.  Since I had background in strategic planning and analysis, they asked if I would take on a small project in support of the Board activities.  They were concerned that funding for the program seemed to be on the decline.  Over the past three years the funding had decreased by $20,000 each year so that the quality of the programs was in jeopardy.  They were at a loss to explain why the sudden decrease in funding over the three year period, and asked if I would undertake some analysis to assist in their planning.

I was glad to assist in this effort and studied the scenario from various perspectives for a month or so.  I interviewed corporate contributors, the teachers involved in the K-12 programs, the professors and other community groups.   I looked at other University groups who approached their funding in a similar way and others who approached funding from alternative means.

Here were my findings:

1.  The business climate in California had changed over the last three years.  Whereas aerospace and petroleum companies dominated the corporate giving scene three years earlier, biotech and medical device companies were beginning to emerge to take their place.

2.  An individual corporate contributor had many more choices in making contributions because many other groups in that California community were doing similar work with schools.

3.  Other University groups had emerged as new curricula developed and these groups increased the number of total University groups seeking corporate contributions.

4.  The methods of solicitation of corporate funding were changing.  Many groups partnered with the stakeholders in the K-12 schools who received the benefits of the programs to provide a brochure to corporate contributors that tied real benefits to both the provider and the receiver.  This method was unlike the solicitation method of the School of Physical Sciences, which relied on its past work to carry the story.

The real themes from this analysis were:

1.  Don’t rely on “static” data to tell a “dynamic” story.  Look at the dynamics of the situation rather than a point in time.

2.  Don’t consider yourself to be the “Center of the Universe” when it comes to activity.   Look at the Corporate contributors as the “Center of the Universe” and map the interactions they have with the groups requesting funding.  This tells two things.  There are more requests than in previous years and many of the requests tell a story that clearly ties in the end result with the level of contribution.

So the real story of the fall-off in corporate contributions was in the dynamics of the business climate and the solicitation model.  Never look statically when you should be looking dynamically.  Never consider yourself to be the “Center of the Universe” around which other activities revolve.   It is a recipe for disaster.

Now, what does this have to do with our scenario of the PMO group and the systems application supporting the Commercial Group?  Over time, as the Commercial Group grew and its business grew, more and more was asked of the vendor who supplied and supported the systems application which facilitated the transactions enabling the Commercial Group to flourish. 

But, there came a time when a new business requirement relayed to the vendor was met with the response “We don’t have any more resources to do this enhancement.   All our resources are fully employed to support the day-to-day operations.” 

The PMO was incredulous.  It had created a strategic partner without really trying.  But it had failed to plan for the development of its partner to support new development work.  Why?  The PMO focused on the static scenario, rather than on the dynamic scenario.  They felt they were the “Center of the Universe” when it came to that vendor’s support.  In actuality, the vendor’s business had grown to support other major companies as well.

This is a good example of how companies can put strategic vendors in place without really trying.  It sounds rather farfetched.  But it really happened to a major PMO organization.  Is your PMO ready to define the capabilities it needs both internally and with external vendors to support the growth that it desires?  Is your PMO looking at static conditions rather than on dynamic conditions for its decision making framework?  Does your PMO consider itself the “Center of the Universe” when it comes to dealing with other key groups and vendors?

I would be interested in your feedback.  Thanks for your time.

This past week was the fifth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina’s devastation of New Orleans.  The commentary on “Meet the Press” stated that it was the largest “man-made” disaster in U.S. history; not the largest “natural disaster.”  Why?  Because at some point in the past, a large (failed) project was undertaken to reinforce New Orleans’ levee system.  This project was supposed to reinforce the levees so that they could withstand the flood waters of anticipated hurricanes and storms.  Unfortunately, the levee system failed during Katrina. 

A new levee system is now being installed by the Army Corps of Engineers.  There are many lessons learned resulting from the previous levees’ failure during Katrina, as well as many years’ data from previous storms and from computer simulations.  These lessons learned are currently being addressed by the design of the new levee system.

What is the actual cost for failure to capture and share project lessons learned?  Aside from the human cost of storms like Katrina, what is the actual “project” cost that is incurred by not capturing, documenting, sharing, and institutionalizing project lessons learned?  How can we get a manageable and actionable handle on the real contribution of project lessons learned on “saving” future project cost?

The answer to this question obviously depends on many factors:  the complexity of the project, the number of systems impacted, the number of dependencies of project info with other like systems, etc.  How can we get a handle on this type of information, and of what value would it be if we were to understand and apply it?

I once studied with a professor whose favorite expression was “Analysis is the Essence.” 

It did not really dawn on me what that statement meant until I encountered some business situations where bad decisions resulted in a failure to meet objectives such as ”on time, on budget.”  In these cases, it seemed to me that the logical sequence of events should be “analysis” followed by “rational thought” followed by “decisions to proceed” followed by “actions.”

We all know that while it is easy to recommend to others courses of action, or specific rationale, or well-thought-out research findings, it is very difficult for others to actually follow-up, and to take the recommended courses of action. 

Why is that?  I believe that everyone has a tendency to believe that if they did not think of an idea themselves, then that idea is not of value to their ongoing, daily processes.  And they may also be biased, and emotionally involved in the decision, so that their “rationality” does not shine through.  As is often said, you can clearly lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink.  It takes motivation and capability.

People decide to take courses of action based upon recommendations from others based on the credibility that they attach to the advice-giver, and the usefulness of previous directions from that person.  Leaders become leaders because they continually disallow their own thinking in favor of the more qualified thinking of their peers and associates; they have learned over time that their own thinking provides merely one perspective of a scenario that really demands many viewpoints to assess, understand, and take action upon. 

So, how do you get people to embrace project lessons learned–first, as a logical step in the project management process, and second, as a rational, thought-based process to provide information for future decisions about project work?

In the course of assisting project teams and PMOs with developing project lessons learned, I have often encountered a resistance to take the time to develop and capture lessons learned, and to share this information with others.  Emotional entanglement–as well as a lack of motivation in the sense that no immediate reward will be forthcoming (and perhaps that negative consequences may ensue)–often dictates the action or inaction.  And I am sure, if you are actively engaged in project work in a PMO, that you have encountered the same.

So let me suggest another tactic.

There is a cost to be borne by the PMO for not capturing and sharing project lessons learned. 

To get a simple model for this cost, let’s assume a model that is often used to get across the point that introducing changes at various key points in a project introduces additional cost to accommodate those changes.

If a project has, for example, four distinct phases, and if a change is introduced during the first phase that costs $10, that same change may cost $100 if introduced during the second phase, $1000 if introduced during the third phase, and $10,000 if introduced during the fourth phase. 

Now, suppose that a project lesson learned is identified in phase four, and that project lesson learned could impact a change at that point, so that the original change in phase one would cost 0.001 times as much. 

Suppose two or three project lessons learned could be identified for every project.   Thinking in an integrative manner to identify where projects could have been improved at previous project phases can deliver real cost savings.  The point here that you should grasp is not whether the savings is 0.001 times the final cost of the change but that this perspective can yield significant savings to any project, no matter how complex or simple.   Train yourself as a project manager to think in these terms and you will always be able to find significant “opportunities” in lessons learned.

Hard dollar reductions are the result of project lessons learned.

What is the situation in your PMO?  Are project managers willing to share project lessons learned?  Does the organization have a process for documenting and sharing project lessons learned to future project teams? 

I would like your feedback on this subject.  Thank you.

Pretend for a few minutes that you are the Vice President of Program Management for your company, and that you are taking some time to “reflect” on where your PMO has been, and where you think it is going.  It hasn’t always been an easy road getting to this point. 

There were times when you thought “project management” might even be a dirty phrase, because the promise just didn’t appear to be there. 

And there was that investment in Training and Development that you authorized that really hit the budget hard when everyone else was cutting back. 

And there have been times when expectations for your PMO have fallen a little short.   But, of course, being the dynamic, forward-thinking manager that you are, you recognized that it just took a little “systemic thinking” to uncover the reasons why the group was being held back.  And once again, after that intervention, the flow returned to the group.

Now it seems that, with the challenges coming from left and right, and organizational change always in the wind, you are questioning what you can do to “motivate” this group further so that it can make that next step change.  You have authorized all the bonus and salary increases that you could, but with the recession really lingering on in your industry, you are concerned that some of those increases might be negated at the corporate level.

A friend suggested to you the other day that you might take a look at the You Tube video by Daniel Pink based on his book Drive:  The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us.  You have been putting that off but maybe it’s time to take a look.  Can’t hurt.

You sit back and watch the video…..twenty minutes away from the phone and the other interruptions won’t hurt anything. 

As Daniel Pink begins to unravel his thesis using a white board and marker, the conclusion hits home rather pointedly.  When individuals who are provided greater monetary incentives to do rudimentary tasks, the old motivation theory seems to bear out; i.e., the more incentive offered, the more the person accomplished of the rudimentary task. 

But now, in Drive, Daniel Pink is making a new argument.  Better pay attention here.  When the task requires some cognitive activity and the processing of higher-level complex concepts, the old motivator doesn’t hold true.  Those who are paid more to accomplish complex tasks actually accomplish less?!!  What is going on here?  That can’ t be.  You sit up and take more notice now.

Daniel Pink continues.  He goes on to say that when people are given more freedom and autonomy to determine which projects they would work on, and when they are allowed to be self-directed in their execution of those projects, they seem to accomplish significant feats.  And then he starts to explain that people who are motivated to master a specific skill (such as a musical instrument) actually go out of their way to achieve this “Mastery”–even if it means making time in their busy lives to accomplish that mastery.

Then he goes on to say that when highly skilled people are questioned about what really motivates them to accomplish something, invariably they say that they feel that their accomplishment gives them a “Purpose” and that they want to “Contribute” to something larger than themselves.

Many of these people are considered the most competent in their field. 

Some of these people happen to be “Project Managers.”  

Daniel Pink summarized by stating that motivation can be thought of as consisting of three “buckets”:

1.  Autonomy and Challenge–”the desire to be self directed”

2.  Mastery–”the urge to get better at stuff”

3.  Purpose–”the desire to make a Contribution”

In the video, Daniel Pink cites several examples of companies and organizations which have allowed their employees to take one day a week or month in which they work on anything they desire to work on with whomever they desire to work, as long as they share it with the others in the group.  His research has shown that this has resulted in those organizations showing dramatic improvements in their processes, systems, and other value-adding components (which, to that point, have yielded mediocre results).

Suddenly, it hits you–this video isn’t just an explanation of some interesting research–it presents some very startling, actionable results.  Some very tangible steps that any organization could take.  SOME STEPS THAT EVEN YOU COULD AUTHORIZE, MR. BUSINESSMAN.

What if?  Your Project and Program Managers are some of most skilled practitioners in project methodology, and scheduling, and team building, and project lessons learned that you have ever seen!  Could they actually improve their own performance and raise the level of performance of the entire PMO and the company with something so simple as this?   Autonomy…..Mastery….Purpose.

You ponder it for a minute and then you turn and pick up the phone.

“George, would you assemble all the Managers in the Conference Room as soon as you can arrange it.”

“What’s the topic?  Motivation and our Program Management Office.  We are going to unleash the power of our most skilled Project and Program Managers and take this organization to the next level of Program Management.”

Are you ready to take the next step?

A number of years ago, the Los Angeles Dodgers and the Cincinnati Reds played a baseball game in which the Dodgers did nothing right and the Reds did nothing wrong.  The final score was 10-0 in favor of the Reds.  In a post game press conference, the Dodger Manager Tommy Lasorda was asked this question by a reporter, “ How do you feel about your team’s execution today?”  Tommy thought a minute and then replied, “I am highly in favor of it.”

Execution.  Getting things done–consistent, coordinated, controlled execution.  It’s the road to success in today’s competitive global marketplace.  But how do you optimize that execution?  How do you correct your PMO’s execution when you’re not getting the expected results?

I would like to provide one perspective to this question based on my experience working in a PMO and observing the changes in its performance and the actions that we undertook to optimize that performance. 

As evidenced in the baseball game mentioned above, execution includes “actions” and “behaviors” and “decisions” on the part of both teams that lead to “results.”  In a sense, we all develop or forecast ”expectations” for those results before they occur, and then we measure the difference between the actual results and the expected results. 

That gap can be very elusive because it contains not only team or group performance items but also individual performance items.  It includes day-to-day decisions and judgments based on information we gather at or near the time of the actions.  It also brings the business context into play.

So optimizing the results from the execution means understanding the “gap” between expectation and actual  and then providing feedback to change the execution.   Sounds like a process lurking in their somewhere!!

Let’s look at an actual example.  Some years ago I was a member of a PMO following the merger of two major corporations.  I had participated in the development of the processes, standards and procedures for the PMO so I understood the “structure” of the PMO quite well. 

During the first year of actual operation following the merger, this PMO was engaged mainly in systems integration and applications/systems rationalization projects as the two merged organizations combined their business systems and in most cases developed a single system going forward where each had had a system before.  An example would be the Credit Card networks of each company being merged into a single credit card system as a result of a PMO project. 

The PMO delivered a number of projects during that first year so that, on a graph of number of projects completed versus time, the upward trend was along about a 45 degree angle.  That performance defined the “expectation” for the PMO.  Nobody stated that expectation as such, but everyone had the idea that the project teams were performing such that they could predict over time how many projects would be completed in the next incremental timeframe.

After about one year in this mode, the emphasis shifted over to the PMO conducting projects for the “business functional” groups in the new merged organization.  During the first year of the merged corporation, those groups had been forming and organizing, and not focused on systems projects addressing business needs.  Over the next year of operation, the curve of projects completed versus time began to flatten out and tended toward some asymptotic level.  The PMO was no longer completing projects at a 45 degree clip. 

What had happened?

A number of us formed a small group to study the structure and execution of the PMO at that point.  We were very aware that there had been a shift from mainly systems integration to new business functional group projects. 

What we found was that there were two basic reasons why projects were lagging in execution. 

First, the PMO had limited financial consulting resources for consulting with the business functional groups on their business case economic analysis.  Such financial consulting was a basic requirement for a complete business case and subsequent funding approval of the project. 

Second, we found that the PMO project coordinators and analysts were having difficulty translating the business functional area business requirements into project scope and business requirements for the projects.  In other words, we were having difficulty “framing” the projects correctly to answer the question “What problem am I trying to solve with this project?”  Subsequently, there were a number of false starts and “reframing” of the projects which led to less total projects completed over time versus those in the systems integration phase of work.

Now the first finding was easily addressed.  The PMO added additional resources to assist with the financial analysis and in many cases partnered with Financial Services to coop those consulting resources. 

Solving the second condition was a little more complex.  When we examined it more closely, we found that the PMO project coordinators and analysts were not holding effective dialogues with the business functional groups to define the project business requirements.  We immediately enlisted the help of “Crucial Conversations” training coordinators to teach effective dialogue within the PMO and business functional groups.  Very rapidly, we began to “frame” the projects correctly the first time leading to good and timely execution.

So, from a prescriptive point of view, what would I suggest you do if your PMO is not executing as expected?

First, look for alignment issues.   Stephen Covey once said “Every organization is perfectly aligned to get the results it gets.”  (See Stephen Covey, “Principle Centered Leadership.”)  Alignment means that business processes, jobs, people, systems, rewards and values and beliefs are aligned so that they support each other in the accomplishment of goals and objectives.  

In the case in which business processes are changed, the other alignment variables must be addressed in order for results to be consistent with expectations.  For example, if a business process is changed which involves a change in jobs and people, then systems and rewards as well as values and beliefs must also be addressed.  Too often in the past companies or smaller organizations within companies have changed business processes and the associated jobs and people without really addressing the systems, rewards, values and beliefs that must support those process changes.  (See Michael Hammer’s Beyond Reengineering for the business model.)  Also look at the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) work by Booz & Company on this subject.

Second, look for changes in objectives or goals or direction.  In the example, the PMO shifted its emphasis from systems integration projects to business functional group projects, which meant a new set of competencies might was necessary to continue with execution as it was expected.

Third, apply some systems thinking to the situation.  (Here, systems thinking can be thought of as in the context of Peter Senge’s Fifth Discipline or Daniel Kim’s work.)

In systems thinking, the organization can be looked upon as a system which refers to organizational structure, culture, processes, procedures, feedback, human interactions, policies and the structure we use to manage the process. 

In systems thinking, we can see organizational processes as either reinforcing processes or as feedback processes.  Reinforcing processes are those in which more is gained as we push harder on the variable defining the process.  Balancing processes are those that tend to retard reinforcing processes.

As a general rule in systems thinking, if a growth scenario appears to be reaching a “limits to growth” situation, then look for the balancing loop that is tending to retard to the growth of the reinforcing loop.  Rather than continuing to push harder on the reinforcing loop, solutions can be more easily found in examining the balancing loop. 

That is why solutions to the PMO scenario in which the project completions were slowing were to be found in the balancing loop which contained the financial/economic analysis as it contributed to the business case and the lack of effective dialogue promoting proper “framing” of the problem and poor business requirements definition.

Fourth, make sure that any major initiative or project which the PMO pursues has a robust Organizational Change Management (OCM) plan to ensure that all the stakeholders of the initiative or the project are addressed according to what is expected of them after the initiative or project is implemented.  If you see results different from expectations following a major internal PMO initiative, look at the associated OCM plan to see how well it performed.

There may certainly be other perspectives on analyzing Execution of the PMO and I invite others to comment on specific situations they have been involved in with PMO activity.  We can all recall a myriad of  interventions we have pursued within organizations to realign expectations and results.   It is a never ending job to continually examine alignment but it is the only method for ensuring lasting, consistent EXECUTION.